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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 10-4538
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILSON RAMIREZ,
a/k/a BEJE
a/k/a ENAMO
Wilson Ramirez,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-09-cr-00579-001)
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 23, 2012
_______________
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 3, 2012 )
_______________
OPINION
_______________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Wilson Ramirez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent

to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
District Court sentenced him to 234 months’ imprisonment, which exceeded the
maximum sentence recommended under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Ramirez
filed a timely notice of appeal. He asserts that the Court committed procedural and
substantive error in varying upward from the Guidelines range. We disagree and thus
affirm. 1
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our
decision. Ramirez pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement that preserved his
right to appeal the District Court’s sentence if it exceeded the Guidelines range. At the
sentencing hearing, the Court calculated the Guidelines range as 168-210 months. It then
considered the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), specifically
discussing Ramirez’s lengthy and “disturbing” criminal history, the seriousness and
sophistication of his offense, its concern that incarceration would not deter him from
reoffending on release, its need to provide a sentence that would promote respect for the
law, and its duty to protect the public. The Court also stated that Ramirez would “still be
a young man when [he gets] out” if sentenced based on the Guidelines range. Appendix
at 84. Finding that the Guidelines range did not reflect the seriousness of Ramirez’s
offense and would be too lenient to promote respect for the law and adequately protect
1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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the public, the Court decided to vary upward and sentenced him to 234 months of
imprisonment and five years of supervised release upon the completion of his prison
term.
On appeal, Ramirez focuses on the District Court’s statement that he would still be
a “young man” if sentenced based on the Guidelines range. He notes that he would be 50
years old when released if sentenced to the maximum sentence recommended under the
Guidelines, an age he contends is not “young.” He thus argues that the Court based its
sentence on an erroneous factual conclusion, thereby committing procedural error. He
further argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because an upward
variance of two years will not change his status as a “young man,” and thus the sentence
did not advance the Court’s goal of deterring him from reoffending.
II.
We review a district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 2009). We apply a two-step process to determine
whether a district court committed procedural or substantive error. Id. First, we “ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural error in arriving at its
decision.” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008). Significant
procedural errors include “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceincluding an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If we determine that the sentence is procedurally sound,
“we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Jones, 566 F.3d at 366.
3

A sentence is substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district
court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
A sentence outside of the Guidelines range is not presumptively unreasonable. Id.
at 567. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “As long as
a sentence falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered
reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” Wise, 515 F.3d at 218.
The District Court based its decision to vary upward from the Guidelines range on
a consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, including Ramirez’s criminal history, the
seriousness and complexity of the crime, the need for general and specific deterrence, and
the protection of the public. Its passing remark that Ramirez would be a “young man” if
sentenced to the maximum sentence recommended under the Guidelines was part of its
detailed and comprehensive analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. It did not commit
procedural error.
In addition, the sentence is substantively reasonable. In addressing the § 3553(a)
factors, the District Court “set forth enough to satisfy [us] that [s]he . . . considered the
parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [her] own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Jones, 566 F.3d at 366 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). A reasonable sentencing court could have imposed the same sentence.
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For these reasons, we affirm.
4

*

*

